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SOME REALISM ABOUT INDIGENISM*
Michael H. Davis**
The debate about creating so-called intellectual property
("IP"')-legal monopolies-over indigenous information (a product mostly of Third World countries) is habitually (almost stereotypically) characterized by qualifications that such monopolies
really don't fit, and further qualifications that although they don't
fit they are the best alternative.2 But underlying both sets of qualifications is often a confusion about what the real problem is. Because of a frequent failure to analyze closely the problem (and
sometimes because of misinformation mixed with an unhealthy
dose of romanticism), critics far too often jump to the legal monopoly solution to problems that ironically may be in large part the
consequences of IP itself.
The debate, as is recognized by critics, involves several distinct
and very different concerns. It would be a remarkable serendipity
if all of them, or even most, could be addressed by a single solution. To make matters worse, it is not even clear that all-or even
many-of them truly merit resolution. But deciding whether they
demand a solution, and what the (various) solutions may be, becomes more difficult when they are confused or misunderstood.
The goal of this essay is first to identify concretely the different concerns in this debate, then to discuss briefly how their characters may demand remedies that are exclusive of one another and
then, most importantly, to determine, once the issues, problems,
and remedies, are exposed, whether they are in truth isolated
* The title is derived, obviously, from Karl Llewellyn, Some Realism About RealismResponding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222 (1931), and those many imitators
before me, my favorite being Arthur Allen Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism
About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451 (1974). The word "indigenism" is my neologism,
but it seems more harmonious with the title, and no less awkward nor neological, than
what the Oxford English Dictionary suggests: "indigenity." 7 OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 867 (2d ed. 1989).
** Professor of Law, Cleveland State University College of Law.
1 Because I do not wish to support the doubtful proposition that so-called intellectual
property merits the label "property," I prefer to call it "so-called intellectual property." To
avoid the awkward repetition of that qualification, I incorporate the entire phrase into the
term "IP."
2 See Paul Heald, The Rhetoric of Bio-Piracy, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L.
(2003).
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problems or whether they are merely consequences of a far more
dominant problem. In other words, despite their disparity, do they
still have something legally important in common? Does IP, especially through TRIPS,3 really offer a solution to the problems Third
World countries seek to resolve? Can it protect the very substance
of indigenism-its cultural intellectual product?
CLEARING OUT THE UNDERBRUSH

Reviewing the literature 4 identifies at least five relatively different goals of indigenism: (1) ownership and control of cultural
information, (2) the ability to exploit and profit from the use by
others of that information, (3) promotion and encouragement of
cultural information, (4) protection and preservation of bio-cultural information, including biodiversity, and (5) protection and
preservation of cultural artifacts. The major legal issues of indigenism and IP involve demands that IP regimes be created to accomplish those five goals. And indigenism has posed these demands
because no existing legal tools have managed so far to accomplish
these goals.
That these are new legal issues is very much the heart of the
problem. Because existing legal regimes do not address many of
these concerns, attempts to do so using existing models are probably bound to be dissonant. This is why the qualifications men3 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994
[hereinafter TRIPS], Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
[hereinafter WTO Agreement], Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND Vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994).
4 See Cathryn A. Berryman, Toward More Universal Protection of Intangible Cultural
Property, J. INTELL. PROP. L. 293 (1994); Rosemary J. Coombe, Intellectual Property,
Human Rights & Sovereignty: New Dilemmas in InternationalLaw Posed by the Recognition of Indigenous Knowledge and the Conservation of Biodiversity, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL
STUD. 59 (1998); David R. Downes, How Intellectual Property Could Be a Tool to Protect
TraditionalKnowledge, 25 COLUM. J. ENvT. L. 253 (2000); Paul Kuruk, Protecting Folklore Under Modern Intellectual Property Regimes, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 679 (1999); Doris
Estelle Long, The Impact of Foreign Investment on Indigenous Culture: An Intellectual
Property Perspective, 23 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 229 (1998); John Henry Merryman,
The Retention of Cultural Property, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 477 (1988); Miriam Latorre
Quinn, Protection for Indigenous Knowledge: An International Law Analysis, 14 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 287 (2001); Srividhya Ragavan, Protection of Traditional Knowledge, 2
MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 1 (2001) Susan Scafidi, IntellectualProperty and Cultural Products, 81 B.U. L. REV. 793 (2001); Madhavi Sunder, Intellectual Propertyand Identity Politics: Playing with Fire, 4 J. GENDER, RACE & JUSTICE 69 (2000); M. Catherine Vernon,
Common Cultural Property: The Search for Rights of Protective Intervention, 26 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 435 (1994).
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tioned at the start of this discussion are so characteristic. The
collision between IP and these novel goals is inevitable. In the end,
it is inescapable that IP was never designed to address these concerns and may well be totally inadequate to do so. Or worse, an
attempt to harness these concerns with inconsistent legal regimes
may, in fact, aggravate the problems.
Next I will clarify the potential IP impact on each of the five
different goals of indigenism. Is IP the appropriate means to reach
those goals? I will conclude that indigenism is not so much a legal
problem, as it is, in all its many facets, an economic one: lack of
wealth.
1.

OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL OF CULTURAL INFORMATION

Indigenism proposes an ownership regime over cultural information, such as folklore, traditional medical products and procedures, mores, and customs. 5 But one must ask how this
information will be protected by regimes that share intellectual
property characteristics. At bottom, IP owners exercise ownership
and control by, in one way or another, profiting from its use, by
either charging a fee for its use by others, or by licensing others to
collect that fee. But it does not seem that indigenism, with respect
to at least some of its concerns, wants so much to commercialize
this information as to assert ownership and control in order to protect it (although, as discussed in the second category, they do want
to share in profits if others commercialize). But protection, as is
noted below, is an entirely different thing than what IP purports to
do-that is, to allow for an efficient means of commercializing information. (In fact, a major goal of IP is to alter, not preserve, its
subject matter by encouraging innovation and thus modifications,
thought of as improvements, to existing inventive and expressive
works 6 ).

If the goal of indigenism is so different from what IP normally
promises, why is indigenism not able to accomplish its goal with a
more appropriate tool? How would one best go about protecting
cultural information from unauthorized use or misuse by others?
What is it exactly that is being protected? It appears that indigen5 See sources cited supra note 4 (especially Downes, Quinn, Ragavan, and Scafidi).
6 "Whoever invents or discovers.., any new and useful improvement ... may obtain a
patent." 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000); see also 17 U.S.C. § 103 (2000) (copyrightability of derivative works).
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ism seeks to protect the integrity of this knowledge from dilution,
erosion, and disappearance, and to do that requires something different than IP. How do societies normally protect their information from a loss of integrity, or worse total disappearance? It
would seem that this is a kind of archiving activity normally accomplished by libraries or depositories in one form or another. Why
does not indigenism simply advocate the establishment of massive
archiving and preservation institutions that would safeguard cultural information from loss?
To pose the question is to answer it. After all, if the indigenous were advanced societies they would have all sorts of institutional devices to preserve and protect their heritage. Is this, after
all, nothing more than a consequence of poverty? Are the demands for legal protection simply an attempt to find an institutional response that appears to be affordable or, perhaps, shifts the
cost to others? Is this not, in the end, a question of wealth?
2.

THE ABILITY TO EXPLOIT AND PROFIT FROM THE USE BY
OTHERS OF CULTURAL INFORMATION AND

CULTURAL PRODUCTS

At the outset, note that this category overlaps the fifth. The

protection of historically significant cultural artifacts is different,
however, from the exploitation of modern productions or reproductions. For the latter, the use of marks of authenticity has been
suggested,7 and, to the extent they are useful, they are no different
in substance from modern (or even ancient) trademarks. The use
of such marks, however, virtually cedes legitimacy to those who
would create non-authentic reproductions. Opposition to those
creations would be problematic once marks of authenticity were
adopted.
The claims that the indigenous have a right to share in the
profits of the use of their cultural information certainly smacks of
some moral claims, and thus gains some apparent legitimacy. It is
also consistent with the classical commercial goals of IP. But the
subject matter, of course, is not consistent with IP-it is not innovative, it exists in the public domain, and thus IP protection serves
none of the classical purposes of IP. Certainly, the indigenous
community would not support Northern demands that the South
pay even more for the use of all sorts of Northern cultural informa7 Scafidi, supra note 4, at 819-20.
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tion that is presently used without additional cost because it carries
no IP protection. (Imagine, for instance, if the North demanded
royalties for the Western style of architecture found in both North
and South today or for the use of all sorts of Western clothing
found in ever-increasing areas of the entire globe.) Why does the
indigenous community demand a right that it could not conceivably
afford to grant to other (developed) communities?
That question is raised because it seems obvious that the indigenous community seeks this profit as one of the only available
sources of revenue it possesses and, as well, sees the Northern exploitation of Southern cultural information as a form of "freeridership." But, if so, both of these reasons are related more to the
poverty of the South than to either the sensibleness of the proposal
or its essential merit. We might ask here, again, what is it that the
indigenous really are seeking here? In this case, it is quite explicitly economic revenue in the form of commercial profits. Once
again, the issue does not seem to be one of IP, but one of wealth.
If it is one of wealth, it is doubtful that the Third World is
going to become wealthy through the sale of its cultural knowledge. If the goal is to equalize the gap between First and Third
World, the sale of cultural information will be exquisitely uncompetitive in a world of high technology. It seems clear that an IP or
IP-based sui generis regime is not going to achieve the real goalcompetitive wealth.
3.

PROMOTION AND ENCOURAGEMENT OF
CULTURAL INFORMATION

In this category there is a host of cultural information amounting to the entire body of cultural identity, and the aims of promotion seem clearly non-commercial. Instead of an ability to exploit
or license others to do so, the goal is quite different: to promote
the use, production, preservation, and appreciation of indigenous
information-for the most part by the respective indigenous populations themselves-while at the same time preventing the intrusion of Northern or Western values, and perhaps saving indigenism
from dilution or extinction. The inaptness of intellectual property
is clear, especially because other tools have long been used to
achieve this goal. For instance, Canada's province of Quebec has
long, although controversially, imposed French-language require-
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ments on various domestic activities,' in order to protect Quebec
culture from English intrusions. Canada itself imposes Canadiansource requirements on its broadcast and film industries, 9 partly to
protect its economic interests as well as its interest in preserving its
national identity from its immeasurably more powerful neighbor.
What is the obstacle preventing indigenism from enacting similar measures to promote their own cultural values and to prevent
Northern and Western intrusions? Once again, the answer seems
to lie in wealth (and the access to appropriate legislative tools that
wealth affords). It is one thing to require the use of a language, but
quite another to resist the appeal of heavily promoted goods and
services. For just one example, to counter the appeal of Northern
and Western clothing, for instance, would require a substantial investment of resources promoting indigenous garb, especially if it
were to be accomplished while, at the same time, preserving individual rights. 10
4.

PROTECTION AND PRESERVATION OF BIO-CULTURAL
INFORMATION, INCLUDING BIODIVERSITY

At least one classic alternative to IP-based sui generis protection of biodiversity is the use of depositories, and land reserves.
On the other hand, it is not at all clear that IP-based measures have
any chance of achieving this goal. One example is the modern IP
regime itself, which purports to require deposit of many patented1
and copyrighted 2 objects for reasons of record as well as for technological accuracy, validity and reproducibility. Moreover, these
deposit requirements extend far beyond bio-products. But in reality these deposit requirements are far more often observed in the

8 Charter of the French Language, R.S.Q., ch. C-11 (1977) (Can.).
9 As a matter of general policy, the Canadian broadcasting system is expected to "encourage the development of Canadian expression by providing a wide range of programming that reflects Canadian attitudes, opinions, ideas, values and artistic creativity, by
displaying Canadian talent in entertainmentprogramming and by offering information and
analysis concerning Canada and other countries from a Canadian point of view." Broadcasting Act, R.S.C. ch. C-11 § 3(d)(ii) (1991) (Can.) (emphasis added).
10 See John Henry Merryman, Cultural Property, International Trade, and Human
Rights, 19 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 51, 61-67 (2001).

11 35 U.S.C. § 114.

12 17 U.S.C. § 407 (2000).
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breach. 3 If IP cannot be trusted to record that which it purports to
record, we are left with depositories and preserves.
What is to prevent indigenism from establishing massive depositories as well as land reserves? To pose the question, once
again, is to answer it: wealth. Western and Northern societies are
the homes of the major biological depositories. They also harbor
large tracts of reserved lands and, coincidentally, are the originators of the concept of land reserves.14 The only thing preventing
indigenism from accomplishing the same goals is wealth. Could
sufficient wealth be generated through the use of deposits? Certainly not. Depositories do not generate wealth and require substantial subsidies to operate.

13 In Amgen v. ChugaiPharmaceuticalCo., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991), the Court of
Appeals refused to invalidate a patent even though the subject engineered cell line had not
been deposited. The Court held that deposit of a non-engineered cell would suffice as long
as the public could achieve the engineered specimen through experimentation. The deposit requirement is generally not well-policed, as Amgen demonstrates. So, too, the Copyright Office routinely fails to require proprietors to deposit works that would reveal secret
information, even though it is that very secret information that is the subject of the copyright bargain between the proprietor, the government, and the public. For instance, "secure tests" need only be submitted for examination by the Copyright Office and then are
returned to the proprietors. Only "identifying material" as opposed to the actual work,
needs to be deposited. 17 U.S.C. § 408(c)(1); see National Conference of Bar Examiners v.
Multistate Legal Studies, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 34 (N.D. 111.1980), affd, 692 F.2d 478 (7th Cir.
1982).
14 Henry David Thoreau called for "national preserves" of virgin forest in The Maine
Woods, which was published posthumously in 1864:
The kings of England formerly had their forests "to hold the king's game," for
sport or food, sometimes destroying villages to create or extend them; and I
think that they were impelled by a true instinct. Why should not we, who have
renounced the king's authority, have our nationalpreserves, where no villages
need be destroyed, in which the bear and panther, and some even of the hunter
race, may still exist, and not be "civilized off the face of the earth,"-our forests, not to hold the king's game merely, but to hold and preserve the king
himself also, the lord of creation,-not for idle sport or food, but for inspiration
and our own true re-creation? Or shall we, like villains, grub them all up,
poaching on our own national domains?
HENRY DAVID THOREAU, THE MAIN WOODS

212 (Penguin Books 1988) (1864).

In 1872, the United States Congress enacted legislation establishing Yellowstone National Park as the world's first national park dedicated to wildlife and ecological preservation. See PAUL SCHULLERY, SEARCHING FOR YELLOWSTONE: ECOLOGY AND WONDER IN
THE LAST WILDERNESS

(1997);

OUR NATIONAL PARKS

(Andrea G. Stillman & William A.

Turnage eds., 1992).
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PROTECTION AND PRESERVATION OF ORIGINAL
CULTURAL ARTIFACTS

Frequently, cultural and other indigenous artifacts are considered "national patrimony. "15 Of all of the goals of indigenism, this
is already achieved, in perhaps limited ways, by legal regimesboth national and international-which do not depend upon the IP
model, but instead on a traditional model of tangibles and their
attendant property rights. Two obstacles, however, are important
to this discussion. To the extent export-import measures are
adopted to achieve the goals, it is possible that they may conflict
with WTO or NAFTA rules limiting obstacles to trade. 6 To the
extent they impose restrictions on free alienability, objections
based on property and even human rights have been raised. 7 Both
of these problems have their source, once again, in wealth. To the
extent indigenism is required to compensate possessors of artifacts
and other culturally important personalty, wealth will be a limiting
factor. And, if GATT or WTO rules limit the ability of indigenism
to freely impose export limitations, those limits will be found in the
ability of indigenism to absorb the financial costs of sanctions that
might be imposed. 8
So far I have suggested how the different goals of indigenism
may be mere consequences of a far more dominant problem. Despite their disparity, they do have something important in common,
although its nature is not that which is commonly characterized as
a legal one. I identified that common feature as being wealth. Of
course, this common feature can find few, if any answers in the
legal world. Quite the contrary: Law certainly is a means for securing wealth, but there is no instance in human history of which I
am aware when it did not and does not function to redistribute
wealth from the dispossessed to the powerful. It is for good reason
that Mao asserted that "power grows out of the barrel of a gun,"' 9
15 See Vernon, supra note 4; Kuruk, supra note 4.
16 Sandrine Cahn & Daniel Schimmel, The CulturalException. Does It Exist in GATT
and GATS Frameworks? How Does It Affect or Is It Affected by the Agreement on
TRIPS?, 15 CARDOZO ARTS & ENr.

L.J. 281, 296, 309-310 (1997).

17 See Merryman, supra note 10.
18 See Cahn & Schimmel, supra note 16.
19 MAO TSE-TUNG, Problems of War and Strategy (November 6, 1938), in 2 SELECTED

WORKS 224 (Foreign Languages Press 1961-1965) ("Every Communist must grasp the
truth, 'Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."').
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and not that it comes from legal institutions. Legal institutions
only rearrange power.
MISINFORMATION, CONFUSION, AND ROMANTICISM
(CHEAP SHOTS)

Compounding the problems of wealth is the misinformation
and confusion that seems inevitable when seeking a solution in the
arcane and abstract world of IP, an incoherence increased by the
dysfunctional marriage of IP with international trade and the
WTO. 20 The failure to understand IP basics is a source of contu-

sion, but certainly not the only one.
For instance, one objection to offering IP protection to indigenism is that it would violate a bedrock principle-that IP exists
to expand the public domain, and that to protect existing knowledge is to revert to the "infamous English regimes" 2' based on that
illegitimate principle. But our present patent law still excludes foreign knowledge from being invalidating prior art,22 and the United
States recently agreed to extend copyright to foreign works that
had been in the public domain.23 So much for principle, bedrock or
otherwise.
Similar suggestions, such as the argument that "moral utility"
should be readopted as a bar to patentability, ignore IP basics.
First, utility has always been more of a negative requirement.
(Generally, with few exceptions none of which are relevant here,
an innovation will be barred by a lack of utility, only if it is exclusively and demonstrably harmful, usually in the sense of illegality).
Second, courts have always refused to become moral or aesthetic
arbiters in intellectual property matters.24 Protecting indigenisni in
this way would not require the revitalization of a moral utility standard that never existed, but the creation of a brand-new one.
20 Michael H. Davis & Dana Neacsu, Legitimacy, Globally: The Incoherence of Free
Trade Practice,Global Economics and Their Governing Principlesof Political Economy, 69
UMKC L. Rev. 733, 762-74 ( 2001).
21 Heald, supra note 2.
22 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
23 17 U.S.C. § 104A (2000).
24 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903). Writing for the
majority, Justice Holmes focused not on the skill of the artist or the aesthetics of the work,
but on originality, and held that courts should not be the arbiters of aesthetics, or determiners of what is art. "It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the
law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations,... and the
taste of any public is not to be treated with contempt." Id.
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Added to the mix is a romanticism that does not help clarify
the issues. To claim that the "South is the contemporary garden of
Eden" that holds "the key or answers to diseases and health
problems '"25 surely overstates the issue. Even worse, such a claim
pins the hopes of indigenous justice upon factual claims that may
turn out to be wrong. Furthermore, claims that the South furnishes
the compounds at the basis of a quarter of the prescription drugs
used in the United States or that three-quarters of the basic compounds used in drug manufacture come from the South 26 are not
only romantic, but apparently wrong.27
THE IRONY OF

IP

(AS A REMEDY TO THE PROBLEMS

OF INDIGENISM)

If the preceding analysis is even partly accurate, the real obstacle to those goals is not to find an IP-based remedy, but to gain the
wealth necessary to achieve them-with or without IP. The irony,
therefore, of suggesting an IP-based remedy as an apparently
costless solution, is that IP is a major source of indigenous poverty.
Surely, TRIPS is the biggest disaster faced by the Third World
since the end of the territorial-based colonial era. In fact, as shown
below, it is a baffling irony for indigenism to choose IP as its savior,
when the sudden international expansion of multinational-imposed
IP itself has further impoverished and immiserated those countries
hosting indigenism.
Well before IP overran its banks, Proudhon said, "All property is theft. ' 2 Today, he might say "All intellectual property is
robbery," for it is a taking of property accompanied by threats of
force and intimidation.29 Sometimes the victims seem more willing
than frightened. For instance, it is not true that "South Africa puts
25 Remigius N. Nwabueze, Ethnopharmacology,Patents and the Politics of Plants' Genetic Resources, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. (2002).
26 Id.

27 My discussions of these claims with knowledgeable scientists and chemical engineers
indicate that most chemicals used in pharmaceutical manufacture derive, in fact, from petroleum or carbon-based materials having little if any connection to indigenism.
28 Although Proudhon is popularly believed to have said this, what he really said was
"It is theft," in response to the question he posed, "What is Property?" P.J. PROUDHON,
WHAT IS PROPERTY? AN INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLES OF RIGHT AND OF GOVERNMENT

11-12 (B.R. Tucker trans. 1966) (Paris 1840); see Michael H. Davis, Death of a Salesman's
Doctrine: A Critical Look at Trademark Use, 19 GA. L. REV. 233, 279 n. 24 (1985).
29 See discussion infra text accompanying note 39 (discussing Section 301 of the United
States Trade Act of 1974); see also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *242 ("Putting in fear is the criterion that distinguishes robbery from other larcinies."); Carter v.
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its feet down to save millions of its citizens ' 30 when it attempted to
compel licenses on AIDS drugs. Aside from the scandal that South
Africa's president then proceeded (and occasionally continues) to
deny that HIV causes AIDS, 3 ' it is also curious that, having joined
the WTO and agreed to TRIPS, South Africa insisted on licensing
these drugs, thus agreeing to pay compensation for them, when it
could just as easily have excluded many of them from patentability
under TRIPS Article 27(3).32
Traditionally, IP is a matter of domestic, not international concern. The doctrine of national treatment does not so much mean
that foreigners deserve the same treatment as nationals-though it
certainly means that as well-but, far more importantly, that no
particular level of protection is merited under any domestic IP regime. National treatment means, first and foremost, that no country is required to recognize patentability (or copyrightability, or
trademarkability) at all.33 Thus, TRIPS, from the perspective of
international law, is an unlawful violation of the doctrine of naUnited States, 530 U.S. 255, 279 n.3 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("[R]obbery is theft
with an additional ingredient, namely the use of force.").
30 Nwabueze, supra note 25.
31 Rachel L. Swarns, Comments on AIDS Weaken Mbeki, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2000, at
A 10; Rachel L. Swarns, No National Emergency, South African Leader Says, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 15, 2001, at A 14.
32 See Michael H. Davis, On the Right of All Nations to Exclude from Patentability
Therapeutic Methods for the Treatment of Humans, Including Those Methods that Involve
the Use of Pharmaceuticals (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). This article
argues that the allowable exclusion from patentability for therapeutic methods includes all
pharmaceutical patents which cover only the use (and thus a therapeutic method) of a
chemical or chemicals as opposed to a patent on the product itself. AZT is one example,
and a large number of patented pharmaceuticals also fit into this category. No country is
required to recognize these claims, and yet South Africa, among others, has not sought to
use Article 27(3) of TRIPS as at least a first step in reducing its dependence on foreign
patent claims.
33 "Where a 'national treatment' standard is adopted, no agreement on the substantive
rights granted an intellectual property owner is achieved. Each nation is required simply
to provide identical protection under its domestic laws to both domestic and foreign rightsholders." Doris Estelle Long, The Choice of National Treatment, Reciprocity or Minimum
Rights,

in

INTERNATIONAL

INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY

ANTHOLOGY

199

(Anthony

D'Amato and Doris Estelle Long eds., 1996); see A. Samuel Oddi, The InternationalPatent
System and Third World Development: Reality or Myth?, 1987 DUKE L.J. 831; Carlos Primo
Braga, The Economics of Intellectual Property Rights and the GATT: A View from the
South, VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 22 (1989) [hereinafter Primo Braga, The Economics of
Intellectual Property Rights]; Carlos Primo Braga, The Developing Country Case for and
Against Intellectual Property Protection, in STRENGTHENING PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 69 (Wolfgang E. Siebeck ed., 1990) [hereinafter Primo Braga, The Developing Country Case].
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tional treatment-a doctrine, along with the principle of territoriality, that is the most basic of all international IP doctrines. In other
words, not only does TRIPS violate its underlying theories of free
34
trade, but it is illegitimate from the point of view of IP basics.
This is so despite the (unsurprising) fact that while TRIPS plays lip
35
service to national treatment, it violates it on a wholesale scale.
Furthermore, the role, and more importantly the true goal of
the United States in forcing the undeveloped world to accede to
TRIPS is just as often misunderstood. It is not true, or at least
misleading, to assert that these countries were told that "failure to
accede to TRIPS might be visited with United States trade sanctions, ' 36 as if mere global adherence to TRIPS were truly the goal,
because the United States has reserved the right to punish countries even after they fully accede to TRIPS. The United States,
under section 301 of its trade law, threatens to impose sanctions
against countries that in its unilateral view deny "provision of adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights notwithstanding the fact that the foreign country may be in
compliance with the specific obligations of the Agreement on
Trade- Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights."37 Thus,
even after threatening to sanction countries for failure to join
TRIPS, the United States continues to stalk and threaten them
with trade sanctions for failing to adhere to United States, not international, standards. Clearly, the United States has far less interest in enforcing TRIPS than it does in enforcing its own raw power
and parochial interests.38
But it is the very core of IP that is the most troublesome, and
ironic. One critic says that "the impact of a patent system on economic development and foreign investment is generally admit34 On the illegitimacy of TRIPS as a part of free trade, see Davis & Neacsu, supra note
20.
35 See TRIPS, supra note 3, art. 3 (national treatment provision inherited from the
national treatment provisions of GATT Article 111(4)).
36 Nwabueze, supra note 25.
37 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(3)(B)(i)(I) (2000); see Sean D. Murphy, ContemporaryPractice
of the United States Relating to International Law, 94 AM. J. INT'L. L. 348, 376 (2000); A.

Lynne Puckett & William L. Reynolds, Current Development, Rules, Sanctions and Enforcement Under Section 301: At Odds with the WTO?, 90 AM. J. INT'L. L. 675 (1996).

38 The trade law provision is merely a symptom of the much larger United States arrogance in using free trade ideology to further not free trade, but private interests whether
consistent with TRIPS and WTO or not. The recent decision by the Bush fits administration to impose protective tariffs on imported steel is yet another symptom. Paul Krugman,
America the Scofflaw, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2002, at A25.
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ted."'3 9 Assuming this means a positive impact, it is certainly not
generally admitted. It is highly doubtful, in fact, that any undeveloped country is well advised to adopt a patent system until its infrastructure is sufficiently developed that it can export roughly as
many patents as it imports. Until that time, it is in its economic
interest to resist adoption of any patent law at all.4 0 The argument
that adoption of a patent system will invite foreign investment simply has no factual support. Canada, for instance, was assured that
if it abandoned its compulsory licenses on pharmaceuticals, United
States investment in the Canadian industry would increase, but exactly the opposite occurred. 41 Countless studies indicate that patents have little if any correlation with technical innovation.42 Even
the United States Supreme Court has observed that innovations
will occur with or without patent protection, which affects only the
speed of discovery.43
Often IP boosters adopt a fallback position that even if IP is
not immediately profitable (to say the least), it is an incentive to
develop an infrastructure of innovation, encouraging local inventors motivated by the new possibility of patent income.4 4 But this
39
40

Nwabueze, supra note 25.
See Oddi, supra note 33; Primo Braga, The Economics of Intellectual Property

Rights, supra note 33; Primo Braga, The Developing Country Case, supra note 33.
41 See Bess-Carolina Dolmo, Note, Examining Global Access to Essential Pharmaceuticals in the Face of Patent ProtectionRights: The South African Example, 7 BunF. HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 137, 150 (2001).
42 WILLIAM BAUMOL, THE FREE-MARKET INNOVATION MACHINE-ANALYSING
GROWTH MIRACLE OF CAPITALISM

(2002);

INNOVATION, PATENTS AND IMITATION

JAMES BESSEN

&

THE

ERIC MASKIN, SEQUENTIAL

(MIT Department of Economics Working Paper

Series No. 00-01, 2000), available at http://www.researchoninnovation.org/patent.pdf.
Baumol observes that innovation is a product of competition, not of intellectual property,
among other things. Bessen and Maskin observe that computer innovation was richer,
more productive, and more robust before IP protection became available.
43 "Whether respondent's claims are patentable may determine whether research efforts are accelerated by the hope of reward or slowed by want of incentives, but that is all."
Diamond v. Chakrabarty,447 U.S. 303, 317 (1980).
44 See, e.g., Evelyn Su, Comment, The Winners and the Losers: The Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights and Its Effects on Developing Countries, 23 HoUs. J. INT'L L 169, 204 (2000) ("Thus, a strong national system to protect intellectual property rights will encourage domestic scientists to remain in their countries and
will also encourage local research and development and domestic enterprises."); Lee
Petherbridge, Comment, Intelligent TRIPS Implementation:A Strategy for Countries on the
Cusp of Development, 22 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1029, 1042 (2001) ("First, LDCs suffer
the basic problem that weak IPR enforcement discourages innovation."). See also Marshall A. Leaffer, Protecting United States Intellectual PropertyAbroad: Toward a New Multilateralism, 76 IOWA L. REV. 273, 283 (1991); Robert M. Sherwood, Human Creativity for
Economic Development: Patents Propel Technology, 33 AKRON L. REV. 351, 359 (2000).
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ignores the indisputable fact of international IP that local inventors
can always obtain patent rights in foreign, much more highly developed, countries even if their home countries have no IP protection
at all. If that is not sufficient incentive, it is simply baffling how the
assurance of IP protection in a country with little or no existing
manufacturing or marketing facilities could be a decisive incentive.
Quite obviously, this argument is but a ruse to encourage expansion of IP-not so that locals can get protection (they can already
receive full protection in those developed countries having IP
which are the only countries that count from the perspective of
providing sufficient economic incentives for innovation)-but so
that the inauguration of an ever-increasing outward drain of precious domestic resources can be legitimized.
The theory of international IP, supported by the two classical
pillars of national treatment and territoriality,4 5 is that a country
should refuse to adopt an IP regime until it has developed its IPproducing industries sufficiently to justify paying royalties to other
nations. By withholding IP until that time, a country can build up
its technical infrastructure (including such secondary but essential
sectors as public education) to a sufficient point that it is able to
become IP-competitive. This is, of course, what the United States
did in the nineteenth century.46 TRIPS, at the proverbial end of
the day, is a mean, cruel, and ultimately immoral theft of the sur45 Graeme B. Dinwoodie, International Intellectual Property Litigation: A Vehicle for
Resurgent Comparativist Thought?, 49 AM. J. CoMP. L. 429, 436 (2001) ("The adoption of
the principle of national treatment as the primary means of ensuring broader international
protection was in fact the corollary of another principle, namely, territoriality."); Lynn
Carino, Note, Creative Technology, Ltd. v. Aztech System PTE, Ltd.: The Ninth Circuit
Sends a United States Copyright Infringement Case to Singapore on a Motion of Forum Non

Conveniens, 41 VILL. L. REV. 325, 333 (1996) ("The Berne Convention and UCC are the
major international treaties in the area of copyrights. From these two treaties evolved the
two important principles of 'national treatment' and 'territoriality."').
46 "There ensued the great Age of Piracy, in which books of several European countries, but particularly English novels, were appropriated and published in such quantities as
to flood the market for a time." 1 JOHN TEBBEL, A HISTORY OF BOOK PUBLISHING IN THE
UNITED STATES 208 (1972); Hannibal Travis, Pirates of the Information Infrastructure:
Blackstonian Copyright and the First Amendment, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 777, 811-19
(2000); Keith Aoki, Neocolonialism, Anticommons Property, and Biopiracy in the (Not-SoBrave) New World Order of International Intellectual Property Protection, 6 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEG. STUD.

11, 58 n.45 (1998); Alan Lewine, Protecting Copyright in the Digital

Millennium: Mudwrestling, Copyright Lawyers: Napster, The RIAA and the Pig Encoder,
20 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 11, 15-16 (2001); Susan Tiefenbrun, A Hermeneutic Methodology and How Pirates Read and Misread the Berne Convention, 17 Wis. INT'L L.J. 1, 5-6

(1999).
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plus national product of all undeveloped countries that become
party to it.
The poverty of the Third World and of indigenism is certainly
due to many factors. But TRIPS and IP generally play a role in
that impoverishment by ensuring that for every step forward out of
poverty, economic tribute must be paid (in the form of royalties,
supra-competitive prices, and prohibitions of the fair use of information necessary for economic development). This is a futile trip
up a ladder that is constantly being lowered. And, most importantly, that role will increase. As long as TRIPS requires these
peoples to pay a substantial portion of their surplus for whatever
monopolized (through patents, copyrights or trademarks) items
they might afford-such as pharmaceuticals-those funds will not
be available to become competitive. Thus, TRIPS condemns indigenism to the poverty with which they entered TRIPS, and renders that poverty permanent.
It is thus then dreadfully ironic that indigenism should be advised to seek in IP the remedies for maladies caused by IP itself.
Aside from the irony, there are insurmountable practicalities. If
indigenism is to pay the First World for the use of all patentable
innovations it needs, it cannot imaginably be rescued by imposing
IP-based remedies upon indigenous information. One would have
to posit that the First World would use so much of this information
that the royalties for its use would somehow come close to the royalties for the manifold technical advances offered by First World
patented products and processes. It simply defies common sense.
The solution is certainly not more IP, but to repeal TRIPS.4 7
There is no reason for the majority of the world to belong to a
convention that is guaranteed to impoverish and immiserate it. To
suggest that the language of IP offers a remedy, when it is the language of IP that causes its poverty and misery is to trap indigenism
into legitimizing the source of its tragic situation.

47 Of course, this is no easy matter, for TRIPS, like GAT', cannot be altered by simple
democratic means through a majority vote. There is a long tradition for consensus decisions, a tradition written into the agreement itself, where consensus cannot be reached. A
supermajority of either two-thirds or three-quarters is required to alter the agreement. All
the more reason, it would seem, to repeal it. WTO Agreement, supra note 3, arts. IX(l),
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CONCLUSION

A close account of the issues of indigenism seems to reveal
that they are all but reflections of the overriding issue of wealth.
We should probably not ignore the remarkable, if wholly serendipitous, similarity between the words "indigenous" and "indigent,"
even though they apparently derive from distinctly different
roots.4a

When the issue is seen as unequal resources, virtually all, if not
all, of the issues of protecting indigenism through legal monopolies
become lamentably unnecessary. If the real problem is the poverty
delivered, and (importantly) rendered permanent by TRIPS, it can
make no sense either to legitimize TRIPS by sponsoring limited
exceptions, or by facilitating variations on the TRIPS scheme.
That can only increase the monopolies that impoverish and immiserate while, at the same time, legitimizing the tools used by the
North to impoverish the South.
At bottom, one of the most serious objections to this pressing
and real problem is an abstract and intellectual, but no less real,
one. That is, by borrowing the language and methods of the oppressors, we may be further empowering them. Thus, while it may
be unrealistic to suggest repealing TRIPS-but, of course, it may
not be-it may be equally or more unrealistic to suggest, or even
actually implement, provisions that render TRIPS even more powerful and immune to fundamental criticism. It seems that this
might be an overriding issue that deserves preliminary
consideration.

48 The Oxford English Dictionary indicates that "indigenous" derives from the Latin
indigen-us, meaning "born in a country, native," while "indigent" derives from the Latin
indige-re, meaning "to lack, want." 7 OXFORD ENGLISH DICIONARY, supra note *, at 867.
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